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Abstract 
Privatization in the Czech Republic was carried out under three programs: restitution, 
small privatization and large privatization. By far the most important privatization 
program in the Czech Republic was large-scale privatization that began in the spring 
of 1991.  
Large privatization allowed combinations of several privatization techniques. The 
largest firms were transformed into joint stock companies, the shares of which were 
distributed within voucher privatization (almost one half of the total number of all 
shares of all joint stock companies was privatized), sold for cash or transferred for free 
to municipalities. 
Despite the massive scale of the voucher privatization, there still remains a substantial 
number of companies where the state has been involved. The total number of 1849 
companies of a book value of 367.5 billions entered both waves of voucher 
privatization. In 1998 the state has kept its involvement in 369 companies with the 
overall book value of more than 440 billions crowns. The book value of the state share 
in these companies amounted to almost 177 billions crowns. A great number of these 
companies was "privatized" through voucher privatization but the state did not 
privatize them entirely. An analysis showed that 76% of the assets (book value of the 
above companies) is possible to be influenced by the state. 
One cannot but to conclude that, despite the voucher privatization, the state sustained 
its influence over the significant part of the Czech economy. In view of the facts it 
seems legitimate to question the official success of the voucher privatization. There 
exist a clear consensus that further privatization of the residual state property is both 
necessary and inevitable. 
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1. Rationales and Origins of Residual State Property 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In 1989 the former Czechoslovakia had one of the smallest private sectors in the 
communist world, employing only about 1.2% of the labor force and producing a 
negligible fraction of the national output. Often cited as one of the major success 
stories of the transition in Eastern Europe, the Czech privatization program resulted in 
almost 75% of productive capacity being transferred to the private sector by the first 
quarter of 1995 after the mass privatization program was completed (for preceding 
overview see Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess (1994) and Blanchard et al. (1991)).  
This is comprehensively captured by Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1 
Registered Corporations According to Ownership 
 
Type of Company 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Number of Incorporated Individuals 891,872 982,075 1,044,635 856,509 1,000,375 
Total Number of Corporations 57,083 83,965 116,706 153,937 196,434 
Privately Owned 16,913 30,097 47,446 64,343 88,582 
Cooperatives 4,031 4,148 4,638 5,227 6,172 
State Owned 16,762 14,125 11,113 9,733 9,432 
Municipality Owned 876 5,490 8,099 9,199 9,980 
Foreign or Joint Ventures 6,349 8,780 13,970 22,715 33,687 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Hanousek and Kočenda (1998) 
 
Privatization in the Czech Republic was carried out under three programs: 
restitution, small-scale privatization and large-scale (or mass) privatization. This 
comprehensive privatization program resulted in a remarkably high share of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) being eventually produced by the private sector. Prior to the 
January 1, 1993 split of the former Czechoslovakia, privatization was carried out 
jointly in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Generally, however, data is available for 
each republic independently and it makes an analysis easier to do. For other references 
related to macroeconomic aspects of privatization see Frydman, Rapaczynski, and 
Earle (1994) and Kotrba (1995) among others. As a summary of the official 
macroeconomic outcome of the privatization process Table 1.2 compares the role of 
the private sector as a percentage share of the GDP in various Central European 
countries from 1990 to 1997. 
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Table 1.2 
Contribution of Private Sector to the GDP (in Percent) 
 
Year Czech 
Republic 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania 
1990 12 9 25 31 16 
1991 17 12 30 42 24 
1992 28 18 42 45 26 
1993 45 25 50 48 32 
1994 56 30 60 70 39 
1995 64 32 68 75 45 
1996 74 35 75 78 50 
1997 78 37 79 81 59 
         Source: IMF, Hanousek and Kočenda (1998) 
 
1.2  Privatization Methods 
The Czech government pursued three major programs of privatization: property 
restitutions, small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization. The first two 
started in 1990 and were most important during the early years of transition.  
 Restitution restored assets to those from whom they had been nationalized by the 
communist regime after 1948. Estimates of the amount of property involved in 
restitution are sketchy since implementation was carried out by direct negotiation 
between current and former owners. There have been at least 200,000 claims for 
agricultural land.  In addition, about 70,000 apartment buildings have been returned to 
their former owners.  For our purposes, the most important feature of the restitution 
program is that owners of industrial property incorporated into larger enterprises (or 
expanded by new investment since nationalization) were entitled to receive a share of 
the enterprise when it was privatized.  In addition, they could purchase an additional 
part of the enterprise on preferential terms (usually at book value and without having 
to compete with other potential buyers). 
 Small-scale privatization dealt primarily with small economic units such as shops, 
restaurants or smaller industrial enterprises that were sold at public auction.  Bidding 
was restricted to Czech citizens or corporations formed by such citizens.  Buyers were 
forbidden from transferring property to foreigners. By the end of 1992, over 22,000 
units with a total sale price of about $1 billion had been privatized through  small-
scale privatization. At least additional 10,000 units were approved for later sale. 
Although there was no explicit limitation on the size of property that could be 
auctioned in small-scale privatization, the program focused on small businesses 
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engaged primarily in retail trade. By the end of 1993, when the program was officially 
terminated, 30.4 billions crowns worth of property had been sold to private owners.  
 
1.3 Large (Mass) Privatization 
By far the most important privatization program in the Czech Republic was large-
scale privatization. This process began in the spring of 1991. Enterprises not 
privatized through restitution or small-scale privatization were divided into four 
groups: 
- firms to be privatized in the first and second waves of large-scale privatization, 
- firms to be privatized later (after five years), and 
- firms to be liquidated. 
It is evident that the first two categories of firms form the core companies where the 
state kept its share. At the beginning it was the Ministry of Privatization that executed 
the process. Later on, the Fund of National Property (FNP) was established as a state 
institution that was entitled with legal power to exercise property rights over the 
companies that were fully or partially owned by the state. 
 Large-scale privatization allowed combinations of several privatization techniques: 
small businesses were typically auctioned or sold in tender; medium businesses were 
sold in tender or to a predetermined buyer (direct sales). The largest firms were 
transformed into joint stock companies, the shares of which were distributed within 
voucher privatization (almost one half of the total number of all shares of all joint 
stock companies was privatized), sold for cash or transferred for free to 
municipalities. Municipalities also benefited from transfers of property, namely 
unused land within their territory. 
As mentioned earlier, large-scale privatization was launched in 1991. Its evolution 
in nominal monetary units is presented in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3 
Large Scale Privatization in the Czech Republic 
 
 Property 
June 93 
mil.CZK 
Units 
June 93 
Property 
June 94 
mil.CZK 
Units 
June 94 
Property 
June 95 
mil.CZK 
Units 
June 95 
Property 
June 96 
mil.CZK 
Units 
June 96 
Total 
Property 
607,635 4,893 922,041 16,071 950,463 20,917 963,453 22,190 
Auction  5,634 431 10,057 1,714 9,378 2,110 9,360 2,054 
Tender 16,434 424 27,931 887 31,236 1,351 36,544 1,750 
Direct 
Sale 
38,016 1,359 86,407 7,713 90,463 10,899 90,156 11,436 
Joint 
Stock 
Comp. 
534,779 1,327 756,008 1,897 765,941 1,875 774,955 1,914 
Free 
Transfer 
12,772 1,352 41,998 3,860 53,445 4,700 52,438 5,036 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Hanousek and Kočenda (1998) 
 
 Over 2,400 firms in the Czech Republic (about half of all firms eligible for large-
scale privatization) were assigned to the first wave, which began in June 1991. For 
each firm assigned to the first wave, the firm's management (under the supervision of 
its founding or supervising ministry) had to submit a proposal by October 31, 1991 for 
how the firm would be privatized. This proposal could involve one or more methods 
of privatization, including direct sale to a domestic or foreign buyer, public auction, 
public tender offer, unpaid transfer to a municipality or other agent, transfer to 
workers, or participation in the voucher scheme. Shares not allocated to the voucher 
scheme could be sold directly to a chosen buyer or offered to the general public on the 
securities market. In addition to indicating the preferred method(s) of privatization, 
each firm's plan had to present basic financial and operational information, including 
employment, wages, capital, sales, costs, profit or loss and foreign trade during the 
period 1989-1991. 
 It was possible for anyone other than the firm management to submit a competing 
privatization plan for all or part of each enterprise. All told, the 2,404 enterprises 
involved in the first wave elicited 11,349 projects, an average of 4.72 projects per 
firm. The founding ministry and the Ministry of Privatization decided among the 
competing projects, except in the case of a sale to a foreign buyer, which had to be 
approved by the government of the respective republic. Since a project could be for 
only part of a firm, the total number of approved projects was about 1.5 times the 
number of firms privatized.  As might be expected, proposals from the management of 
firms were most likely to be approved.  Management projects accounted for between 
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20 and 25 percent of all proposals, but over half of those were approved. Proposals to 
purchase all or part of a firm were the second most commonly approved group. 
 Although it may appear that the allocation of shares to the voucher scheme resulted 
from proposals generated "from the bottom," in fact the privatization authorities had 
rough goals regarding how much property they wanted to be included in the voucher 
program and indicated how the vouchers would be finally allocated. In the end, 988 
firms out of the 2,404 firms in the first wave had some or all of their shares allocated 
to the voucher program. The vast majority of these firms distributed over half of their 
net worth through vouchers, with an average of 61.4% of capital being placed in the 
voucher scheme. The second largest share (23.3%) was retained by the Fund for 
National Property. Much of this share either has already been or will eventually be 
sold in the equity market. 
The scale of the voucher program can be appreciated by examining the share of total 
assets placed in it. In 1990 the official book value of all capital in the Czech Republic 
was Kcs 2,604 billion2 (about US$95 billion). Of this, about Kcs 1,000 billion was 
included in the first wave of large-scale privatization.  Firms in the voucher program 
had a book value of about Kcs 331 billion, of which slightly over 200 billion was 
allocated to vouchers. Thus, the first wave of the voucher program included about 
7.5% of the country's capital assets. The second, somewhat smaller wave, was 
completed by the end of 1994. 
As a summary Table 1.4 shows the two-wave process of voucher privatization 
translated into major numbers. These numbers give only a rough sketch of the 
situation, though. 
Table 1.4 
Brief Overview of Voucher Privatization 
 
 
Subject Wave 1 Wave 2 
No. of State Enterprises 
Entering the Voucher Scheme 
 
988 
 
861 
Book Value of Shares Allocated for Voucher in Particular Wave (billions of crowns) 212.5 155.0 
Participating Citizens (in millions) 5.98 6.16 
Average Accounting Value of Assets per Participating Citizen (crowns) 35,535 25,160 
% of Voucher Points with IPFs 72.2% 63.5% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Privatization, Hanousek and Kočenda (1998) 
                                                 
2 We adopt standard Czech monetary notation.  Prior to the split of the country the Czechoslovak koruna (crown) 
was abbreviated Kcs and placed before the numeric figure. After January 1993, the Czech koruna was abbreviated 
Kč and placed after the numerals. 
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2. Controlling Institutional Structures of Residual State Property 
 
2.1 Large Privatization and Investment Privatization Funds: Indirect Residual 
Property 
 The Investment Privatization Funds formed a popular form of how the citizens 
allocated their points from the large privatization. For these points the funds acquired 
shares in numerous companies, where the state also kept its share. At the same 
moment it has to be noted that a number of these funds was formed by financial 
institution where the state has kept its large share. Thus the funds involuntarily 
became to a certain extent institutional managers of the residual state property. The 
next part helps to understand the situation. 
 All Czech citizens over the age of 18 who resided in the Czech or Slovak Republics 
could participate in the voucher process. Each participant could purchase a book of 
1,000 voucher points for a fee of Kcs 1,000 (a little over one week's wage for the 
average worker in 1992).  Before the bidding process started, each voucher holder had 
the option of assigning all or part of his points to one or more Investment Privatization 
Fund (IPF). These IPFs had to provide basic information regarding their ownership 
and investment strategy. In addition, information regarding profitability, sales, growth 
rates, and extent of proposed foreign involvement for each firm was provided in a 
booklet available to all voucher holders. Anyone who brought a diskette to the 
privatization offices could obtain this information in a database designed to make 
analyses easy.  A great number of citizens opted to put their stakes into the funds. 
 Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the most important fund groups that managed to gain more 
than 2% market-share and their relative position on the market. 
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Table 2.1 
Position of the Major Funds on the Market: Wave 1 
 
Founder No. of Points 
Allocated 
Market 
Share 
Cumulative 
Market Share 
No. of 
IPFs 
Česká státni spořitelna 950918800 15.494 15.494 1 
První investiční, a.s. 713837100 11.631 27.126 11 
Harvard Capital and Consulting 565170000 9.209 36.334 6 
V+B Invest, i.a.s. 500668100 8.158 44.492 1 
IKS KB spol. s r.o. 465708300 7.588 52.081 1 
Kapitál. invest. společnost, a.s. 334234900 5.446 57.527 1 
Slovenske Investicie, s.r.o. 188041300 3.064 60.591 1 
Creditanstalt, a.s. 138924800 2.264 62.854 1 
Prva Slovenska Investicni, a.s 136348000 2.222 65.076 11 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Hanousek and Kočenda (1998) 
 
 
Table 2.2 
Position of the Major Funds on the Market: Wave 2 
 
Founder No. of Points 
Allocated 
Market 
Share 
Cumulative 
Market Share 
No. of 
IPFs 
A-Invest, investiní společnost, a.s. 309243300 7.896 7.896 2 
Investiční společnost Expandia, a.s. 306290600 7.820 15.716 3 
Harvard Capital and Consulting investiční 
společnost, a.s. 
292170900 7.460 23.176 23 
O.B.Invest, investiční společnost, s.r.o. 198351200 5.064 28.240 3 
KIS, a.s., Kapitálová investiční společnost České 
pojišťovny 
186697800 4.767 33.007 3 
Investiční společnost podnikatelů, a.s. 159263500 4.066 37.073 2 
Investiční společnost Linh Art, s.r.o. 156432100 3.994 41.067 3 
Czech Investment Company investiční společnost, 
spol. s r.o. 
151666300 3.872 44.939 1 
Spořitelní investiční společnost, a.s. 124161800 3.170 48.110 1 
Investiční kapitálová společnost KB, a.s. 124063500 3.168 51.277 1 
PPF investiční společnost, a.s. 119703700 3.056 54.334 2 
První investiční akciová společnost 97629000 2.493 56.826 5 
C.S. Fond, a.s., investiční společnost 94007200 2.400 59.226 7 
Moravská agrárně potravinářská investiční 
společnost, akciová společnost 
89932800 2.296 61.523 1 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Hanousek and Kočenda (1998) 
 
 The first wave of voucher privatization started slowly. During the first two months 
citizens could buy voucher coupons, only a few hundred thousand did so. By January 
of 1992, official estimates were that only about 20% of eligible participants would 
purchase books before the official deadline at the end of February. However, in the 
next two months demand soared, largely in response to advertisements by several of 
the IPFs guaranteeing returns of 1,000% in one year.3 In the end, 75% of those eligible 
                                                 
3 Although these guarantees sound extravagant, they were in fact rather conservative. They were based on the 
artificial Kcs 1,000 registration cost for a voucher book. Since the book value of assets being sold averaged about 
Kcs 35,000 per coupon book, there was little risk in promising to redeem shares in IPFs for Kcs 10,000. 
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to participate did so. About 72% of the voucher points were placed for bidding with 
one of the 264 IPFs in the Czech Republic, while 28% were retained by individuals.  
There was substantial concentration among the IPFs, with over 56% of the points 
given to the funds being controlled by the thirteen largest funds. 
 
2.2 Residual State Property 
 Despite the massive scale of the voucher privatization, there still remains a 
substantial number of companies where the state has been involved. From Table 1.4 
we know that 1849 companies of a book value of 367.5 billions entered both waves of 
voucher privatization. In 1998 the state has kept its involvement in 369 companies 
with the overall book value of more than 440 billions crowns. The book value of the 
state share in these companies amounted to almost 177 billions crowns. A great 
number of these companies was “privatized” through voucher privatization but the 
state did not privatize them entirely. 
 The Fund of National Property (FNP), as a legal owner, is involved in different 
degree in a vast number of companies. Such degree is represented by the number of 
shares the state holds in each company that belongs to the portfolio of the FNP. An 
illustrative perception of such an arrangement can be extracted from Figure 2.1 that 
presents relative numbers of enterprises in each category of state ownership. The 
ownership structure is divided into four ranges of involvement depending on the 
percentage portion of shares that belong to the state.  
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Figure 2.1 
Relative numbers of enterprises in each category of state ownership 
8%
2%
5%
85%
100%
75.1- 99.9%
50.1- 75%
below 50%
 
Thus, Figure 2.1 depicts relative number of enterprises falling into each of four 
categories of state ownership. These are: (i) enterprises where FNP holds 100% of 
shares, (ii) enterprises where the proportion of shares in FNP’s ownership ranges from 
75% to 99.9%, (iii) enterprises where FNP holds more than 50% but less than 75% of 
shares, and finally (iv) enterprises in which share of FNP amounts below 50%. One 
can observe that the enterprises in which the state keeps more than fifty percents of 
shares represent only a relatively small part of all firms, namely 15%. 
However, such an assessment would be too simple for such a complicated matter as 
the ownership structure of the state represents. Therefore, Figure 2.2 takes into 
account a book value of each firm. This enables to derive perception of an economic 
power of the companies and consequently the extent of wealth that is controlled by the 
state through the amount of shares. 
 
 11
Figure 2.2: 
Relative Book Value of enterprises in each category of state ownership 
4% 2%
35%
59%
100%
75.1-99.9%
50.1- 75%
below 50%
 
 As revealed by Figure 2.2, when the relative book value of enterprises in each 
category is considered, it seriously undermines the former observation about the 
influence of the state. The relative book value of those enterprises which entirely 
belong to FNP is no more than 4% and a relative number of these is about 8%. 
However, the relative book value of all enterprises where the FNP has a share over 
50% reaches spectacular 41%. It has to be noted that the control over 41% of 
companies is effected solely through the voting rights associated with the number of 
shares above 50%. Thus, even though the state literally controls only seemingly 
unimportant part of Czech companies, as far as number of firms is concerned, the 
book value of this part is no longer unimportant. One cannot but to conclude that, 
despite the voucher privatization, the state sustained its influence over the significant 
part of the Czech economy. 
 
2.3 Residual Cross-ownership 
We already noted that the state control is associated with the ownership in 
companies and banks that may involve a certain degree of cross-ownership. To 
understand the problem, let us consider the following example: 40% of shares of 
company A is owned by company B, while the rest is the property of company C. 
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Company C is, however, owned from 60% by company B. Clearly, the real influence 
of company B over company A is much bigger than the primary ownership indicates.  
The question of how to evaluate the extent of such influence that stems from cross-
ownership is not easy to address. Turnovec (1999) suggested new methodological 
approach, which can provide some insight in the real property rights in an enterprise 
with cross-ownership involvement. The matrix algebra based technique was designed 
to unveil the indirect ownership that is usually hidden behind the scene, on which the 
‘actors’—seemingly unrelated owners—perform. In the following section we briefly 
outline the matrix-algebra technique proposed by Turnovec (1999), and present the 
results by applying the methodology on the case of the major Czech banks.  
Suppose there is m primary owners and n secondary owners. Primary owners can be 
citizens, the state, municipalities, etc. and they can own, but cannot be owned. 
Secondary owners are companies that can be owned. Let 0jis  denote the direct share 
that the primary owner i (i=1, …,m) has in the secondary owner j (j=1,…,n), 
expressed as the proportion of the total number of j’s shares. Similarly, let 0jkt , 
j,k0{1,…n}, denote the direct share of the secondary owner k in another secondary 
owner j. Let us label the matrix  
nj
mijis
,..,1
,...,1
00 )(
=
=
=S  
as the primary property distribution matrix and matrix 
 
nj
mijit
,..,1
,...,1
00 )(
=
=
=T  
as the secondary property distribution matrix. The couple },{ 00 TS then represents an 
primary property distribution in the economy. If follows from the definition of 0S and 
0T that for any j=1,…,n it must be that 
 1
1 1
00
=+∑ ∑
= =
m
i
n
k
jkji ts .  
Expressing the same in matrix form yields 
 nnm eeTeS =+
00 , 
where ne denotes the n-dimensional vector of composed of 1’s.  
Let us assume that 
nn0T ≠
0 , where by 
nn0 we mean nn×  zero matrix (if 
nn0T =
0 we have a transparent ownership structure that deserves little theoretical 
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interest). Then the real share of i’s primary owner in company j is given not only by 
i’s direct ownership ( 0jis ), but also by the shares i holds in the other owners of j, 
namely, in other companies k0{1,…n}, jk ≠ . Thus the “first degree” ownership of 
the primary owner i in the secondary owner j can be defined in the following manner 
∑
=
+=
n
k
kijkjiij stss
1
0001 . 
Analogously, one can express the “first degree” ownership of secondary owner k in 
another secondary owner j 
 ∑
=
=
n
l
lkjljk ttt
1
001 . 
In matrix form this can be expressed as 0001 STSS +=  and 001 TTT = . Exploiting 
further the suggested notion of  “gradual” ownership, the following is definition of the 
“r-th degree” ownership 
111 −−−
+=
rrrr STSS , and 
11 −−
=
rrr TTT . 
Having defined the methodology for examining the indirect ownership, we present 
some results of its application in the Czech banking sector. The following Table 2.3 
shows how the position of the Fund of National Property in the five leading banks 
changes, when one considers the “higher degree” ownership.4 Not only the percentage 
share increases but in one case exceeds the 50% threshold that is so important in case 
of voting (KB). In other case (CSOB) no change occurs simply because the rest of the 
shares is already owned also by the state, however, through other legal bodies that are 
not considered by the above technique. We did not include the other case where no 
change occurred (IPB) due to the fact that this bank (IPB) was in 1997 fully privatized 
through the sale to a foreign strategic investor. Such “real” privatization is subject of a 
section 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 We reproduce only a part of the table. We intentionally omit the display of secondary owners’ rights 
(secondary owners are represented mainly by investment funds) to simplify the exposition.  
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Table 2.3 
Indirect ownership among the major Czech banks 
 
Bank 
property of FNM 
        primary                   the first degree       the second degree       the third degree 
CS 52.80 57.22 59.19 59.23 
CP 30.25 38.40 38.40 38.40 
KB 48.74 50.27 50.89 50.90 
CSOB 65.69 65.69 65.69 65.69 
Degree is represented by percentages. CS—Česká spořitelna, CP—Česká pojišťovna, KB—Komerční 
banka, CSOB—Československá obchodní banka. Source: Turnovec (1998). 
 
 
3. Corporate Governance Implications of Residual State Property 
 
3.1 State Management 
State keeps the control of its property through the presence of its deputies in the 
statutory bodies of the companies. Each joint-stock company is, according to the 
Commercial Code, obliged to maintain Board of Directors and Supervisory Board. The 
Board of Directors is either executive or non-executive, or in certain cases a mixed one. 
In case of executive Board of Directors the position of director corresponds to that of 
executive officer. State nominates its deputies mainly to non-executive Board of 
Directors, while positions of executive officers are filled with professional managers. 
This way the state exercises control over the company. 
 In cases where the Board of Directors is an executive one, the state puts great accent at 
the function of Supervisory Board. The board is usually staffed with the deputies of state 
with exception of those members that are elected by the employees of the company. 
Since management has to ask Supervisory Board for approval in most important matters 
connected with operation, strategy, and expansion of the company, the Supervisory 
Board is an important body and medium for the state to exercise its control. The 
members of the boards are recruited from the top officials at the ministries under which 
jurisdiction the company operates and from the experts approved by the ministries and 
the Fund of National Property. 
 The influence of the state is exercised by various means. The simplest extent of 
control is through the number of shares or the percentage portion of the state property 
that is represented by voting rights. Other mean is embodied in a “golden” share. Such 
an instrument, in a form of a single share with a special status, allows the state to 
 15
prevent any major changes in a company where the state holds such a share. Utility 
companies are a typical example of the state control through the golden share. Many 
other companies has been declared strategic and enjoy a special status that is embedded 
in related legal provisions. 
 The overall influence of the state over 369 companies belonging to the portfolio of 
the Fund of National Property is documented in Figures 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 
Relative number of enterprises by categories of the state’s strategic influence 
5%
6%
21%
68%
strategic & golden share
strategic
golden share
others
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the relative number of enterprises in four categories that illustrate 
the influence of state. Fund of National Property holds golden share in 21% of 
companies of its portfolio. Enterprises labeled as ‘strategic’ amount to 6% of such 
companies. Further, the FNP keeps golden share in 5% companies that were already 
declared strategic. The first three categories together, i.e. all the enterprises in which 
the state can effectively influence decision-making, contain 117 companies. The 
number accounts for 32% out of the total of 369 companies. 
Despite the fact that the aggregate book value of these three categories, however, as 
documented by Figure 3.2, sums up to the incredible 72%.  
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Figure 3.2 
Relative book value of enterprises by categories of the state’s strategic influence 
15%
47%
10%
28%
strategic & golden share
strategic
golden share
others
 
 
 In order to evaluate an effective control power of the state over the companies we 
have to combine all feasible means of control together. Figure 3.3 therefore combines 
the previous approaches in that it shows the relative book value of all enterprises in 
which FNP either holds the control package of shares (over 50%), or it maintains the 
strategic position otherwise (via golden share, etc.). 
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Figure 3.3 
Relative book value of enterprises controlled effectively by the state 
 
76%
24%
influenced by the state 
others
 
If we translate the Figure 3.3 in to absolute numbers we conclude that 76% of the 
relative book value of the companies influenced by the state represents 332.7 billions 
crowns out of the total number of 369 companies in the portfolio of the Fund of 
National Property that amounts to the book value of more than 440 billions of Czech 
crowns. This means that the state is able to control enormous part of the Czech 
economy. 
 
3.2 Ownership Environment of the IPFs and Management Regulations 
 Large-scale privatization brought companies out of direct state ownership, but left 
them without proper management. This was due to the fact that shares in legally and 
newly created companies belonged to the state, investment funds or banks, or were 
spread among numerous small shareholders. The interest of investment funds in 
increasing the net asset value of the shares on one side and the lack of power of small 
shareholders on the other created an extremely soft-management environment. Such a 
situation was not a suitable environment for the active management and necessary 
restructuralization of non-competitive industries. 
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 Over time, however, the situation changed considerably. The investment funds 
started to trim their portfolios to weed out non-productive companies or to create 
positions for eventual transformation into holding companies. Sales for the sake of 
sheer profit were also not uncommon. Of particular importance is that such a process 
enabled firms to affect a corporate governance since the majority shareholders in each 
company started to transform their firms while pursuing active management. Despite 
the fact that the issue of corporate governance was addressed by Aghion, Blanchard, 
and Carlin (1994), and Coffee (1996), among others, literature on the corporate 
governance of companies in transition economies is still insufficient. 
IPFs were subject to a number of regulations that made them resemble closed-end 
mutual funds in the West. Technically, funds for the first wave of voucher 
privatization were organized as "Legally Independent Joint Stock Companies" since 
the law that allowed more conventional mutual funds (including open-ended funds) 
did not come into effect until after the deadline for registering funds for the first 
round.  Funds had to be approved by the Ministry of Privatization and had to have at 
least Kcs 1 million in initial capital. The structure of Joint Stock Companies that 
emerged out of  privatization is conveniently presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 
Structure of Joint Stock Companies Privatized Through Voucher Scheme 
 
 No of Units into which Privatized SOE Were Divided 
 1 2-4 5-9 10- Total 
Czech JSC 600 248 99 41 988 
Slovak JSC 320 108 70 5 503 
Total CSFR 920 356 169 46 1,491 
Second Wave 324 160 74 118 676 
Source: Database of the Center of Voucher Privatization 
 
 For a fund to be approved, the founder had to submit a plan including the contract 
between the founder of the fund and the fund itself (which was required to be a 
separate legal entity). This plan was required to document: 
1) the management conditions of the fund, 
2) the number and qualifications of the administrators of the fund, 
3) information regarding the board of directors and supervisory board of the fund, and 
4) the fund's investment policy regarding risk taking and sector specialization. 
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 Czech corporate governance is a melding of American and German models. As we 
mentioned earlier in section 3.1 each firm has two governing boards, a Board of 
Directors and a Supervisory Board. The Board of Directors is elected by the general 
shareholders to actively manage the company. The Supervisory Board is elected 30% 
by employees and 70% by shareholders. It tends to have limited powers, best 
characterized as the ability to harass the Board of Directors. 
Compensation to a fund's founder (operator) for managing the fund was limited to 2% 
of the nominal value of shares gained through voucher privatization plus up to 3% of 
assets and 20% of the fund's profits each year following privatization.  Government 
officials were excluded from serving on the board of an IPF. Each IPF could not 
invest more than 10% of its points in a single company nor obtain more than 20% of 
any company. 
Initially related funds from a single founder could own no more than 40% of a firm. 
This was later reduced to 20%.  Funds could, in fact, exceed this limit if they agreed 
to sell the excess within six months of the opening of trading in the firm on the Prague 
Stock Exchange. In addition, mergers among funds could mean that this limit was 
violated and firms would have to sell shares to come into compliance. 
Since the most common situation was for the founder of a fund to be an already 
established financial institution, regulations also forbade funds founded by financial 
institutions from purchasing shares in financial institutions. The potential for financial 
concentration is evident from the fact that the six large financial institutions included 
in the first wave of voucher privatization controlled 5 out of the 6 largest groups of 
IPFs. Together these six financial institutions obtained the right to bid over 36% of all 
the points in the first wave of voucher privatization. Such outcome was naturally 
translated into an ownership structure. 
 
4. Residual Privatization 
 
4.1 Direct State Share 
Apart from the residual state property that is in reality managed by privatization funds 
the state still keeps important share in numerous joint stock companies. As a summary 
Table 4.1 shows in a brief but highly illustrative way current situation regarding direct 
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involvement of the state in the companies that are contained in the portfolio of the 
FNP. 
 
Table 4.1 
Direct Ownership of the State 
 
Categories of FNP’s share Number of 
enterprises 
Book value of enterprises (in millions of 
Czech crowns) 
100% 28 16578.6 
75.1-99.9% 6 8549.9 
50.1%-75% 20 154804.5 
below 50% 315 260147.9 
Total 369 440080.9 
Source: Fund of National Property 
 
It is evident that the state still owns an enormous share of the economy through its 
ownership involvement in various companies. This fact should be contrasted 
especially with the number of companies that entered voucher privatization as well as 
with the scope of privatization in general. The state currently owns shares in 369 
companies and this portion amounts to almost 155 billions crowns. The book value of 
these companies is next to three times greater though. The most valuable portion of 
assets falls into the category of 20 companies where the state holds more that half but 
less that three quarter share. Most of these 20 companies is considered as strategic 
ones and they account for more that a third of total book value of the companies in 
question. In view of the facts it seems legitimate to question the official success of the 
voucher privatization. 
 Nevertheless, the state felt its obligation to privatize further. The next two sections 
describe a case of bank privatization and the outline of future prospects to privatize 
the rest of the residual state property. 
 
4.2 A Case of a Bank Privatization: Sale to a Foreign Investor 
During the years following the formal end of the mass privatization nothing much 
changed as for the real privatization since the state has kept massive share in the 
voucher-privatized companies. The intention to privatize further has materialized in 
several cases though. As a case study we present the description of the privatization of 
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the bank that has belonged to so called “Big Four” among the banks in the Czech 
republic. 
The Czech government approved the plan of the privatization of the Investment and 
Post Bank (IPB) on November 27, 1996. The privatization of this bank was to be 
arranged through the sale of shares owed by the FNP (31.5%) and Czech Post (4.45%) 
to a strategic foreign investor. Set of criteria for a choice of a foreign partner was 
announced subsequently and renowned privatization advisory company, Salomon 
Brothers, was appointed to manage the tender. Fourteen candidates took part in the 
tender. Out of these candidates, four advanced to the second stage. The companies 
that were found eligible to bid were: Nomura, ING Bank, ABN AMRO, and Deutsche 
Bank. The Nomura came out as the most suitable candidate. 
On July 23, 1997 the government of the Czech republic issued a decree about the 
sale of the state share in the IPB to the Nomura Europe PCL. In order to precise the 
sale price, an audit of the IPB was commenced. On March 8, 1998 the FNP and the 
Nomura Europe PCL signed the contract about the sale. Several binding conditions 
formed a part of the contract. Both parties involved agreed upon the price that 
amounted to nearly 3 billions of Czech crowns. One major condition was that Nomura 
would increase the total equity of the IPB by 6 billions crowns, and would be an 
exclusive issuer of this increase. Besides that, the Nomura had to commit itself to 
being an important issuer of the emission of bonds that took place on April 16, 1998. 
During the extraordinary general assembly of shareholders that took place on March 
8, 1998 the Nomura promised to the other shareholders of the IPB, that it would not 
take part in the second increase in the bank’s equity, so that the other shareholders 
could renew their positions. The second increase occurred in September 1998 without 
Nomura’s participation, and its volume reached 1.701 billions of crowns. As for the 
corporate structure it has to be mentioned that at the general assembly in March 1998 
a major change in the bank’s statutory bodies occurred to reflect new ownership 
division. The governance structure of the bank was further altered later in 1998. 
At the beginning of 1998 the IPB substantially increased its reserves and loan-loss 
provisions which has resulted in the total loss of 11 million crowns. Such an operation 
was to reflect troubled financial situation of the bank that reflected state of affaire 
within the Czech financial sector. The loss was naturally mirrored in the bank’s books 
and the IPB covered it mainly with an aid of reserve funds. Having taken the steps 
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described, the bank was ready to increase its efficiency. It has set an ambitious goal 
for 1998 in a form of a net profit around 2 millions crowns. In the first half of the 
1998 it declared the net profit of approximately 1 million crowns. By September 30, 
1998 the net profit rose by other half million crowns. As for the year-to-year growth in 
revenues from financial activities the IPB exhibited 24.5% increase. Beside that the 
bank managed to stop the rise of operation costs, which lead to favorable values of 
cost/income index, as well as to high level of revenue, which increased by 42.4%. In 
addition, there was a significant increase in the volume of primary accounts (16.4% by 
September 1998). The uneasy process of transformation did not cost the IPB the trust 
of its customers and the total number of customers reached 2.5 millions by September 
30, 1998. 
It is obvious that only the future will show the complete picture about the 
privatization of the IPB. So far the bank did reasonably well. In any event its 
privatization was until now the only completed privatization of its kind within Czech 
banking sector. 
 
4.3 Privatization Schedule 
Political crisis at the end of 1997 resulted in a dissolution of the government by the 
president who appointed new government to consolidate state affairs. Selection of the 
cabinet was made with professional merits rather than political affiliation on mind. 
This government received a time-limited mandate until the elections that were held in 
July 1998. The government intended to privatize the share of state property first in the 
so-called strategic companies. In order to do so, the privatization schedule was set up. 
Table 4.2 list all important companies the government wanted to fully privatize in the 
nearest future. These companies are divided in to three categories that correspond to 
the time phase of their privatization. 
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Table 4.2 
Proposal of Privatization Schedule: Strategic Joint-stock Companies 
 
 Name of Company Share of State (%) Industry 
First Category Česká pojišťovna 30.25 Insurance industry 
 Mostecká uhelná společnost 46.29 Mining 
 Severočeské doly 54.00 Mining 
 Sokolovská uhelná 48.69 Mining 
 Aero Holding 61.83 Aircraft industry 
 Paramo 70.87 Oil industry 
    
Second Category ČSOB 65.70 Banking 
 Komerční banka 48.74 Banking 
 Česká spořitelna 45.00 Banking 
 16 energy distributing companies 46.70-59.10 Energy industry 
 OKD 45.88 Mining 
 Budějovický Budvar 100.00 Brewery 
 Sevac 78.86 Pharmaceutical industry 
    
Third Category Čepro 100.00 Transport industry 
 Unipetrol 62.99 Oil industry 
 České aerolinie 56.92 Air transport 
 Vítkovice 34.01 Steel industry 
 České radiokomunikace 51.00 Telecomunications 
 Mero 100.00 Oil industry 
 Škoda Praha 54.77 Machinery industry 
 ČEZ 67.57 Energy industry 
 Nová Huť 34.00 Steel industry 
 SPT Telecom 51.83 Telecomunications 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
The first category contains companies that were selected to be privatized 
immediately and the strategic investor was to be selected entirely throughout the 
public auction. Firms operating in the mining industry dominate this section. The 
second category contains companies that would be prepared for privatization but the 
details would be clarified later. Three out of four largest banks belong to this cohort 
and steps towards their privatization were already being taken. Companies falling in to 
the third category were subject to further objectives of the government but the 
objectives were not clearly specified. 
 General elections held in July 1998 were won by the Social Democratic Party that 
after lengthy deliberation formed a majority government and signed so called 
“opposition agreement” with its political competitor, Civic Democratic Party, to avoid 
eventual clashes of power. The political change brought also the different perspective 
towards the blueprint of residual state property privatization. Table 4.3 lists the most 
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important strategic companies where the state holds substantial share and provides a 
brief outline of the intended privatization schedule. 
 
Table 4.3 
Proposal of Privatization Schedule: Strategic Joint-stock Companies 
 
Name of Company To be privatized Share of State (%) Industry 
Aero Holding 1999-2000 61.83 Aircraft industry 
Budějovický Budvar 19992 100.00 Brewery 
Čepro After 2000 100.00 Oil industry 
Česká spořitelna 1999–first half of 20001 45.00 Banking 
Česká pojišťovna After 19981 30.25 Insurance industry 
České aerolinie After 19981 56.92 Air transport 
České radiokomunikace 20011 51.00 Telecommunications 
ČEZ 20022 67.57 Energy industry 
ČSOB In the process 65.70 Banking 
Komerční banka 1999–first half of 20001 48.74 Banking 
Mostecká uhelná společnost 19992 46.29 Mining 
Mero After 20022 100.00 Oil industry 
Nová Huť 19992 34.00 Steel industry 
OKD 19991 45.88 Mining 
Paramo 19992 70.87 Oil industry 
Sevac After 19982 78.86 Pharmaceutical 
industry 
Severočeské doly 19992 54.00 Mining 
Sokolovská uhelná 19992 48.69 Mining 
SPT Telecom 20011 51.83 Telecommunications 
Škoda Praha After Nuclear Plant 
Temelín is finished 
54.77 Machinery industry 
Unipetrol 20011 62.99 Oil industry 
Vítkovice 19992 34.01 Steel industry 
16 energy distributing 
companies 
2000-20021 46.00–59.00 Energy industry 
Notes: 1 sale, 2 preparation for privatization, decision on how to privatize 
 
The government approved only a privatization framework without outlining details 
concerning privatization of different strategic companies. When compared to the time 
schedule of the consolidation government (Table 4.2) it is evident that the 
privatization of strategic companies tends to be delayed within the range from one to 
three years. In certain cases the timing proposal is entirely missing. The banks are the 
only exception because the government wants to privatize them as quickly as possible. 
Such a strategy might be contra-productive, though. Since many of the strategic 
manufacturing companies are heavily indebted with the strategic banks, the 
privatization of both categories of firms should be effected more or less 
simultaneously. 
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Further, the privatization in energy sector was put on hold. Privatization schedule 
assumes that sales of energetic distribution networks will take place from 2000 to 
2002. However, decision regarding further direction of privatization of the monopoly 
electricity producer (ČEZ) will wait till 2002. According to arguments in Kočenda and 
Čábelka (1999) such an approach might result in inept consequences. 
As for the natural gas processing and distributing companies, the government 
intends to acquire back various portions of shares so that the state would again keep 
majority in such companies. Eventual sales would then be effected from a majority 
owner position. Relatively quick sales are expected in cases of one oil processing 
company and two coal mining companies where the state still holds sheer majority. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Privatization in the Czech Republic was carried out under three programs: restitution, 
small-scale privatization and large-scale (or mass) privatization. The Czech 
government pursued three major programs of privatization: property restitutions, 
small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization. Restitution restored assets to 
those from whom they had been nationalized by the communist regime after 1948. 
Small-scale privatization dealt primarily with small economic units such as shops, 
restaurants or smaller industrial enterprises that were sold at public auction. 
By far the most important privatization program in the Czech Republic was large-
scale privatization that began in the spring of 1991. Large-scale privatization allowed 
combinations of several privatization techniques: small businesses were typically 
auctioned or sold in tender; medium businesses were sold in tender or to a 
predetermined buyer (direct sales). The largest firms were transformed into joint stock 
companies, the shares of which were distributed within voucher privatization (almost 
one half of the total number of all shares of all joint stock companies was privatized), 
sold for cash or transferred for free to municipalities. 
This comprehensive privatization program resulted in a remarkably high share of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being eventually produced by the private sector. Often 
cited as one of the major success stories of the transition in Eastern Europe, the Czech 
privatization program resulted in almost 75% of productive capacity being transferred 
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to the private sector by the first quarter of 1995 after the mass privatization program 
was completed. 
The Investment Privatization Funds formed a popular form of how the citizens 
allocated their points from the large privatization. For these points the funds acquired 
shares in numerous companies, where the state also kept its share. At the same 
moment it has to be noted that a number of these funds was formed by financial 
institution where the state has kept its large share. Thus the funds involuntarily 
became to a certain extent institutional managers of the residual state property. 
Despite the massive scale of the voucher privatization, there still remains a 
substantial number of companies where the state has been involved. The total number 
of 1849 companies of a book value of 367.5 billions entered both waves of voucher 
privatization. In 1998 the state has kept its involvement in 369 companies with the 
overall book value of more than 440 billions crowns. The book value of the state share 
in these companies amounted to almost 177 billions crowns. A great number of these 
companies was “privatized” through voucher privatization but the state did not 
privatize them entirely. 
Even though the state literally controls only seemingly unimportant part of Czech 
companies, as far as number of firms is concerned, the book value of this part is no 
longer unimportant. One cannot but to conclude that, despite the voucher 
privatization, the state sustained its influence over the significant part of the Czech 
economy. 
Translated from absolute numbers we concluded that 76% of the relative book value 
of the companies influenced by the state represents 332.7 billions crowns out of the 
total number of 369 companies in the portfolio of the Fund of National Property that 
amounts to the book value of more than 440 billions of Czech crowns. This means 
that the state is able to control enormous part of the Czech economy. In view of the 
facts it seems legitimate to question the official success of the voucher privatization. 
The government recently approved a privatization framework without outlining 
details concerning privatization of different strategic companies. When compared to 
the time schedule of the previous government it is evident that the privatization of 
strategic companies tends to be delayed within the range from one to three years. The 
banks are the only exception because the government wants to privatize them as 
quickly as possible. Such a strategy might be contra-productive, though. Since many 
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of the strategic manufacturing companies are heavily indebted with the strategic 
banks, the privatization of both categories of firms should be effected more or less 
simultaneously. Further, the privatization in energy sector was put on hold. 
There exist a clear consensus that further privatization of the residual state property 
is both necessary and inevitable. We have described the origins and the current 
situation in this matter. We also outlined the scope and timetable of the official 
strategy in privatization. The future will tell the results. 
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